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As the Marine Corps finishes twelve years of combat, it is entering into another interwar period. Significant lessons can be learned from studying the post-World War I and postVietnam War interwar periods. These lessons are framed along the three phases that constitute an interwar period. Additionally, the doctrine, organization, material, leadership & education, and personnel pillars must be applied during the appropriate phases to successfully navigate the interwar period. The desired endstate of navigating an interwar period is a force that is transformed with a new vision, high quality personnel, updated doctrine and organization, and the material solutions to support the vision. Success in an interwar period is defined as a force that can conduct combat operations during the interwar period while going through transformation, and results in a force that is victorious in the next major conflict.
A Marine Corps Interwar Period Analysis and Implications for Today
The only strategy that can mitigate the impact of surprise is knowledge of the past, an understanding of the present, and a balanced force that is willing and able to adapt in the future.
-The Joint Operating Environment, 2010 1 As the United States Marine Corps closes the chapter on twelve years of combat in the Middle East, it finds itself at the beginning of a new interwar period. As the Marine Corps has done in previous interwar periods, it must transform itself for the next major future conflict, while preserving the ability to respond to a crisis during the interwar period. Even though the military has not been correct in predicting when and where the next major conflict will occur 2 , the Marine Corps has always successfully postured itself during previous interwar periods to apply the right changes at the right time to succeed in the next major war. The Marine Corps must apply the lessons learned from the previous interwar periods to ensure it is successful in the current upcoming interwar period. This paper will show how the Marine Corps can leverage the lessons of the previous interwar periods to emerge from the newest interwar period postured to prevail in future conflict. As the Marine Corps conducts planning for the future of the service, the lessons from two significant 20 th Century interwar periods, specifically the postWorld War I and post-Vietnam War, are invaluable to today's planners for the insight they provide. These lessons will be examined in the light of the three phases characteristic of an interwar period: austerity, transition, and prosperity. Additionally, this paper will identify the changes that occurred in each interwar period along the institutional pillars of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF). 3 Using these perspectives (phasing and DOTMLPF pillars) this paper will outline a roadmap for the Marine Corps to follow into the next interwar period.
Interwar Period Definition
There has been much written about the Marine Corps' activities during the years between the end of World War I and the beginning of World War II, but there isn't an academically agreed-to definition of an interwar period. 4 That being said, there are two critical factors that define an interwar period for a nation's military. First, the period must be bounded by significant conflict. Second, there is a significant reduction in funding for the Department of Defense, followed later by an increase at the follow-on conflict period. coupled with fiscal decreases and later followed by significant resource increases between the conflicts, defines an interwar period.
The three phases of austerity, transition, and prosperity provide a useful construct for analyzing the lessons of an interwar period. The first phase, austerity, is characterized by fiscal and manpower drawdowns following a major conflict. This is the time that can produce the most turmoil as the force contracts and difficult decisions on prioritization and allocation of resources must be made by the leadership of the service.
This phase is also characterized in the Marine Corps with a sense of paranoia as the Marine Corps has historically fought for its existence during this phase. The second phase, transition, is the time when fiscal and manpower reductions are negligible and the size of the force stabilizes. Historically, the onset of this phase and its duration vary significantly, due to economic and political variables. It is during the transition phase when the Marine Corps goes through its most significant explosion of ideas as the concern over the elimination of the Marine Corps has subsided. This phase also sets the foundation for the future of the force.
The final phase, prosperity, is characterized by increases in budgets and manpower, coupled with the full realization of new vision of the Marine Corps. These three phases allow us to model the actions during past interwar periods that will be useful to the Marine Corps to succeed during the upcoming interwar period.
The DOTMLPF institutional pillars are also useful in analyzing the lesson of an interwar period. These pillars describe the necessary operational and functional capabilities required for the Marine Corps to successfully negotiate the coming interwar period. By overlaying the DOTMLPF pillars with the phased actions of the Marine Corps during the historical interwar periods, a pattern emerges that provides a productive template for the future. A successful interwar period is defined by the Marine Corps when it has successfully conducted combat operations while it transformed the force with a new vision, high quality personnel, updated doctrine and organization, and the material solutions that supported the vision, which resulted in a force that is victorious in the next major conflict.
Interwar Period Analysis
The Another interwar period that provided quality lessons learned was the time between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War. This time period also exemplifies the classic traits of an interwar period as it was bounded by two major conflicts and saw the typical fiscal and manpower drawdown at the beginning (austerity), stabilization in the middle (transition), and increases at the end (prosperity). 24 The Marine Corps was successful during combat operations in the interwar period and successful during the Gulf War because it applied the right changes along the DOTMLPF pillars at the right phases of the interwar period.
Austerity Phase (1971 Phase ( -1979 In 1971, the Marine Corps found itself on familiar yet unstable ground. During the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps spent nearly six years side-by-side with the United
States Army conducting protracted ground combat operations. General Robert E.
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Cushman USMC pushed for a re-establishment of the Marine Corps as the amphibious force for the nation because he didn't want the Marine Corps to be seen as another land army. 25 Individuals and think tanks stated that the Marine Corps needed to transform itself into an organization equipped primarily for sustained ground combat for inland operations in Europe alongside the US Army during the Cold War. 26 The Marine Corps' concern about its potential elimination was used by General Cushman to focus on the advancement of quality of Marines in the service and to develop a new vision for the Corps.
Also during the austerity period of the post-Vietnam interwar period, the Marine
Corps began a significant budget and personnel drawdown. This manpower drawdown was additionally complex because it was reducing its endstrength and converting into the all-volunteer force. General Cushman focused on manpower quality during the drawdown and not on material modernization, 27 as he wanted to ensure that Marine entry training remained tough to build and sustain the Marine esprit de corps. 28 General Cushman invested in the abilities of his Marines through education and schools, and professional discourse all the while maintaining the core capabilities, requirements, and responsibilities to the nation with the operational readiness of the Marine Corps.
General Cushman wrote several professional articles, discussing the future of the Marine Corps. The most important factors in his articles were his concerns for costs and personnel reductions, coupled with his desire to ensure that the Marine Corps sow the seeds necessary to ensure the Marine Corps' ability to adapt to the unexpected. 29 He outlined ideas for advanced, high speed amphibious ships, a future generation of vertical/short take-off and landing aircraft, and theoretical employment concepts for the future of the Marine infantry battalion, but there must be tradeoffs for modernization and manpower. 30 This set the groundwork for a purposeful plan to re-create the identity of the Marine Corps.
General Louis H. Wilson USMC followed in the direction of General Cushman and made his primary focus the individual, amphibious Marine. He enhanced operational readiness through intense individual and collective training by establishing a combined arms training center at the Marine base in Twenty-nine Palms, California. 31 Additionally, General Wilson established a study to look at mission and force structure requirements to provide a combined arms force that is responsive to threats globally. 32 This structure study would begin the eradication of the hollow Marine Corps where structured units would finally be manned at adequate levels. 33 At the end of the Along the material pillar, the procurement of the Light Armored Vehicle family of vehicles in 1983 was a material advancement supporting the maneuver warfare operational concept. The Light Armored Vehicles were highly mobile vehicles designed to find and exploit the enemy's flanks and weaknesses 40 and it was an adaptable and light vehicle that was able to rapidly deploy via any tactical air or sealift asset that could operate across the spectrum of conflict. 41 One of the downfalls of a material advancement before the doctrine could be solidified, was the organization supporting entering into a time of significant fiscal reduction. 46 In fact, the Marine Corps has already been reducing its topline budget for the past two years 47 and reducing its endstrength as well. 48 A third sign that is always present at the beginning of an interwar period is the fear of the elimination of the Marine Corps. This proposal has been recommended by several critics stating the Marine Corps must be able figure out how to be the decisive power in the time and place that matters in the future, or risk elimination. 49 A new wrinkle to this interwar period is that our strategic guidance documents describe a security environment more diverse and complex than has been seen in previous interwar periods. 50 Marine Corps' Way Ahead into the Austerity Phase
As the Marine Corps enters the austerity phase, the lessons learned from the past interwar periods must be considered. In the austerity phase, the energy from the concern of being eliminated must be harnessed. This energy must be applied into the the future material requirements that will be advanced in the prosperity phase.
Just as there is no set length for the austerity phase, the transition and prosperity phases do not have a set length. Only once the vision, doctrine, and organization are in place, and there are increases in budget and manpower strengths, will the prosperity phase be attained. The prosperity phase is characterized by the acquisition of the materials needed to make the vision a reality. Only with the doctrine and organization adjusted to support the vision is it appropriate to venture into the expensive realm of material advancements to make the vision a reality. A prime example of this is the 1941 acquisition of the first amphibious assault vehicles during the post-World War I interwar period. 63 Only with the vision codified, the doctrine written and the organization set, was the force ready to acquire the correct material solution to make the vision a reality.
It is an absolute requirement that the Marine Corps only focus on material solutions to support the vision during the prosperity phase of an interwar period. As history tends to be cyclical, the lessons learned from the post-World War I and post-Vietnam interwar periods are critical to navigating the current interwar period.
Conclusion
It is imperative that the Marine Corps follow the lessons learned to be successful during and at the end of this interwar period. The heritage of the Marine Corps is strong, and its predecessors have left a clear path to follow to be successful once again. It is incumbent on the leadership of the Marine Corps to follow the template and transform the Marine Corps appropriately so it can continue to win our nation's battles.
